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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DAVID K. PETIT, : Case No. 960032-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following are set forth in full in Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether evidence should have been suppressed because the 
seizure of Mr. Petit constituted an arrest without probable cause 
in violation of the fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
and article I, section 14 of the Utah constitution? 
Standard of review. The trial court's determination of 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion is reviewed for correctness, 
while granting some measure of discretion to the trial court in 
applying the standard to a given set of facts. State v. Hodson, 
907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 
(Utah 1994); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
Preserved below by motion to suppress, R. 20-21, the hearing held 
thereon, R. 97-139, and appellant's conditional plea, R. 66-7, 69-
77. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
David K. Petit was charged by information with possession 
of cocaine (3rd degree felony) and drug paraphernalia (class B 
misdemeanor). R. 4-5. Mr. Petit filed a motion to suppress all 
evidence obtained as a result of his unlawful detention and arrest, 
R. 20-21, which was denied. R. 55-8 (memorandum decision).1 
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Petit pled guilty to 
attempted possession of a controlled substance (class A 
misdemeanor), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress. R. 69-77 (Statement of defendant, certificate 
of counsel, and order) , 66-7 (minute entry) . Mr. Petit was 
sentenced to probation for two years. R. 77-8. This appeal 
ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties stipulated that a transcript of the 
preliminary hearing could be used for purposes of deciding the 
motion to suppress. R. 98. A copy of this transcript is contained 
at R. 23-52. This transcript reveals the following: 
^Although the court requested that the State prepare findings 
and conclusions, R. 57, no such findings or conclusions appear in 
the record. 
2 
On October 13, 1994 at 7:55 P.M., officer Michael Tuttle 
was patrolling on foot in uniform with officers Hoffman and Roland 
at approximately 258 South Rio Grande. R. 23-5, 47. Officer 
Tuttle observed: 
I noticed that Mr. Petit was inside of the 
truck that was facing south. As officers started walking 
across the street, Mr. Petit made eye contact with an 
officer then reached for something underneath or beyond 
our vision. 
R. 24. Officer Tuttle was approximately 20 feet away; visibility 
by overhead lighting was approximately 30-40 feet. R. 25. At the 
preliminary hearing the officer characterized the motion as "lunged 
forward," while his contemporaneously prepared report states that 
Mr. Petit "suddenly reached down the side of the inside door as if 
reaching for, or throwing away something." R. 26, 34-36, 59 
(police report). Officer Tuttle was "concerned that the occupant 
was reaching for a weapon and [he] drew [his] pistol" and told him 
to stop. R. 26; 36-7, 43. The officer pointed his loaded weapon 
directly at Mr. Petit. R. 38-9. Officer Tuttle could not tell 
what Mr. Petit was reaching for, and conceded that the movement was 
consistent with something as innocuous as spilling a cup of coffee. 
R. 37. 
At that point in time, Mr. Petit was not free to leave. 
R. 37, 40. Mr. Petit complied with the command to stop, and the 
subsequent command to let the officer see his hands and place them 
on the steering wheel. R. 26-7, 37-8. Officer Tuttle then 
"hollered and continued walking towards the truck." R. 27. 
3 
Officer Hoffman was approximately 10 to 15 feet from the 
truck when Officer Tuttle drew his weapon. R. 48. Officer 
Hoffman, on the passenger side of the vehicle, noticed some 
syringes and informed Officer Tuttle. R. 28. Officer Tuttle 
noticed blood on Mr. Petit's left arm. R. 27. Mr. Petit was asked 
to exit the vehicle, R. 27-8, some 10 to 15 seconds after the 
encounter began. R. 41. Prior to asking Mr. Petit to exit the 
vehicle, none of the officers asked Mr. Petit any questions. R. 
41. Mr. Petit was handcuffed before any questions were asked. R. 
42. The first question Mr. Petit was asked was whether he had any 
more syringes. R. 29. 
At the time of the encounter with Mr. Petit, there had 
been no calls of any reported crime, or any weapons. R. 33, 47. 
Prior to the time the officers started walking towards the truck, 
there was nothing unusual going on with the vehicle. R. 35, 49. 
The officers observed no offense being committed. R. 36, 48-9. 
The No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet describes the encounter 
as follows: 
Officers Tuttle and Hoffman were walking north 
bound on Rio Grande Street. Officer Tuttle noticed 
movement inside of a parked pick up facing south bound. 
The occupant inside suddenly reached down the side of the 
inside door as if reaching for, or throwing away 
something. Officers were both concerned that the 
occupant was reaching for a weapon and officer Tuttle 
drew his firearm and told the occupant to put his hands 
on top of the steering wheel. The occupant complied. 
Hoffman went to the other side of the truck and looked in 
thru an open window noticing several syringes. Hoffman 
told this to Tuttle who noticed blood on the occupant ['] s 
left arm at the inner elbow. It should be noted that 
officers have both been working the shelter area for some 
time and have bought drugs undercover and made multiple 
drug arrests. This blood spot on the occupants arm along 
4 
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had been using drugs prior to contact with police. 
Officer Tuttle th[e]n had the occupant (later id'd as 
Petit) get out of the vehicle. As the A/P got out of the 
vehicle, a can that was being used to cook cocaine fell 
to the ground. A/P was handcuffed. When A/P got. u; , 
Officer Hoffman watched A/P underhand throw f:om his 
right hand a syringe full of a. red liqu[i]d[.] [W] hen 
A/P was asked if there was any [ ] more syringes in the 
truck he stated "just the one 1 was about to shoot up 
with." A/P states that there isnt: enough cocaine in the 
syringe to get; M m f • • anything. AP&P responded to put 
a hold or A 
R. 5 9 . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
actions oi = !;- police i'aare const i t ate an arrest 
Wdb 'merely concenitu loi Li,1- safety based e" :a_ c ..-udden 
movement .\ a; •• \ .mo aie.i ou^n o-: I ; a ^rarf'ed ;w the
 x-^
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c:riminal acnv r y aia Mr !o: i- was tul .y compliant wit;h a"; 1 
}"-. i^ 'e requests Officer Tat * !<--'r; actions xii ura : " • *-r h i s r i rearm 
< : - .;.<:•!. • :.\ .. ;,c approaching LI^ „- \diicj^( ; . L 
witnout asking any questions to confirm --a dispel his concerns, 
were not mir>"tv • ^  • r.\ r \:r* v-o coy f !* ' iast intris; ans 
a v a:i ] ab3 e t : i i -JL . r was reace. .
 ::; . r a 
weapon to use to assault the officers. HIK! I i_hese circumstances, 
a n a r r e s t o c c u l l c a wxtiiout • robable cause. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE POLICE CONDUCT IN THIS CASE 
CONSTITUTED AN ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 
889 (1968) the Supreme Court approved limited investigative 
detentions premised on reasonable suspicion. "Our evaluation of 
the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads 
us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to 
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the 
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing 
with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he 
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The 
officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is 
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
that of others was in danger." Terry, 3 92 U.S. at 27. 
A. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT A SEIZURE 
OCCURRED. 
"We adhere to the view that a person is "seized" only 
when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his 
freedom of movement is restrained." United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980) 
(opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.). For fourth 
amendment purposes, a person is seized "only if, in view of all of 
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id. at 554, 
6 
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 J J 2 h ^ i a ^ i , . x n • a c c o r d F l o r i d a v . R o y e r , 4 ' ' ) T r S . 
1 - . - 1 3 2 6 f • A 2 a 2 2 9 , 2 3 9 ( 1 9 8 3 ) 
• • . : ; • • a d o p t i ., ; i.e 
Mendenhall t e s* • Late v. Higgins, 8 8 4 P. 2d 1242, 124 4 (tit ah 
1994) . 
Petit, a reasonable person \- <;: Petit's pi :«ce wou.il not nave teit 
free1 leave -,: Pet" it was seized officer "'u! t-'iri '* '"'v-e'jf 
, . . , • . . . • ^ 
:i iticai questii::- J • Uri ;i appeal -. r, -hethei \ han seizure amounted 
to an ^ rre~t- * whether it v-: : ' r •-Dr-rriately limited 
investigative detention as allowe^ ,.
 ;, ,.^ i ± } 
B. PQL1PP SEIZURES TPVP' i-,\ ., _ _ _ _ 
LEAST INTRUSIVE FP<;ANS REASONABLY 
NECESSARY MUST BF PREMISED *. PROBABLE 
CAUSE. 
" Tt is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure 
it seeks to -Pistif\ r- <}-),•. i^.Vi:\r. rj .-, reasonable suspicion was 
cona j i Loud oi. ii^  \ \ • vestigat ive seizure." Florida v . Roy e r, 460 
IPS. 491., c3f. • -3 S.Ct. 1319, 13 2^, 7 - P 9i.2d 229, 238 (1983). 
•' T e n y = ! • .-! '• - ":r . . ] :i mi te .d :i n 
scope and execuL-:! ' xrouqh :::-e i-'ah1. restrictive means." United 
States v. Novak, y 7 0 1 Pu I v-i - • • . • •• ] 98 9) An 
i i n : * • .•' * n .. . • « = i: v a 
v a l i d m v e s t i g a t i ve d e t e n t i o n int-> :• n p r o p e r a r r e s t : 
"y 
To qualify as an investigative stop, a police officer's 
detention of a suspect must employ "the least intrusive 
means reasonably available to verify or dispel . 
suspicion in a short amount of time." [Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. at 500] . If the force used exceeds these 
limits, an investigative stop is converted into an 
arrest. United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 636 (8th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 837, 106 S.Ct. 113, 88 
L.Ed.2d 92 (1985) (Jones). 
Applying the "least intrusive means" standard 
to the facts of a case requires that we balance the 
competing interests of the police officer against those 
of the private individual. In general, a police officer 
may take steps reasonably necessary to protect his or her 
personal safety and the safety of others and to maintain 
the status quo of a situation while verifying or 
dispelling suspicion in a short period of time. Id. at 
636-37 (citation omitted). A number of factors are used 
to determine whether the amount and kind of force used 
was reasonable and consistent with an investigative stop. 
These include: (1) the number of officers and police cars 
involved, (2) the nature of the crime and whether there 
is reason to believe the suspect is armed, (3) the 
strength of the officer's articulable, objective 
suspicions, (4) the need for immediate action by the 
officer, (5) the presence or lack of suspicious behavior 
or movement by the person under observation, and (6) 
whether there was an opportunity for the officer to have 
made the stop in less threatening circumstances. Id. at 
639-40. 
United States v. Seelve, 815 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1987). 
Numerous cases illustrate the point. In United States v. 
Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974), police were conducting 
surveillance of suspected cocaine dealers. The court held that the 
defendant and the other passenger in his car were arrested at the 
time that the police boxed his vehicle in with 3 squad cars and 
pointed a gun at the occupants of the surrounded vehicle: 
To decide the case at bench, we need not 
prescribe precisely the point at which police action 
which detains a suspect ceases to be a nonarrest seizure 
and becomes an arrest; for we simply cannot equate an 
armed approach to a surrounded vehicle whose occupants 
have been commanded to raise their hands with the 'brief 
stop of a suspicious individual in order to determine his 
8 
IderiL^Ly ... . - ^iiitain the Litaiu.: j^ .., ^ ^n^nLaj. i.,
 2 rtu, ,^ 
obtaining mcr^ information* which was authorized in 
r Adams, v.] Williams. 407 T; \\. u = !• :"t •,)21l 2 
L.Ed,2d ^ ° r ^  9 ^ 1 , ) 
Strickler, 4 9r- h.2d at. -w0. 
T,
"
:
 ^ I l i t e d S t a t e s - ._ h a m p k i " I • iV- ' .•"•*-: J m . 
i .x ' •• ; ' . . j u l e r ^ v.. L . ^ ^ . . ^ a , ..*c . >....;. j r a w n 
q u n s i n a n a i r p o r t * -i r e t ina l . " : T | h e a r r e s t was e f f e c t u a t e d at t h e 
iriStart rhr- -la-pt - -; ; M" =T . • - H] :Wr; '-.r, 1 * "V? - . ; v o r "' •: ; : l -\< } 
h i m r-. , , . . . . . . o t a j . , „i.: W < ;.: ,.;l .CU...I Lb-.. O J I K . I O , . . f 
rhe officers wlv:. ::-< 1 demonstrated an intentior • r.,-sko- h..-\\ ji'ito 
In United States v. Robertson, 83 3 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 
•••t(--pec ted metl lamphetami ne ] at • was stopped 
i;V f.i',.iice on l.;ir- sidewalk: 
We -; ..h-jiudc that the officers' detention of 
• Steeprow at gunpoint was an arrest which required 
probable cause. Steeprow was confronted by seven to ten 
police officers, one of whom aimed his gun at her nose, 
told her to freeze, and detained her for at least five 
and perhaps fifteen minutes. The restriction of her 
liberty of movement was complete upon this encirclement 
by officers who gave her orders at gunpoint: . • 
Steeprow was not armed, but the officers make no attempt 
to discern if she was armed, thereby strongly suggesting 
that they had not the slightest indication that she was 
armed. [cite omitted] Nothing in the record suggests 
that the display of force was necessary to ensure her 
compliance with a request to stop, [cites omitted] 
Accordingly, the purpose of the asserted "Terry stop" --
to allow the officers to investigate without fear of 
flight or violence, see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 
92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 2 (1972) -- was not served by 
the intrusion, imposed. 
Robertson, 83 3 F 2d it ; 8] 
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Numerous other cases are in accord. E.g. United States 
v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 81-2 (2nd Cir. 1982) (arrest occurred where 
3 or 4 DEA cars blocked progress of vehicle, and agents surrounded 
the vehicle with guns drawn) ; United States v. Larkin, 510 F.2d 13, 
13 & n.l (9th Cir. 1974) ("a confrontation with a vehicular 
blockade and drawn weapons cannot be equated with an investigative 
detention1'); United States v. Troutman, 458 F.2d 217, 220 (10th 
Cir. 1972) (arrest was made at the time officers stopped vehicle 
with drawn guns); United States v. Novak, 870 F.2d 1345 (7th Cir. 
1989) (seizure of companion of drug courier in airport concourse by 
six to nine officers at gunpoint exceeded bounds of Terry stop and 
constituted an arrest); United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 
1046 (10th Cir. 1994) (training weapons on stopped vehicle, 
ordering occupants to throw keys out the window, and ordering them 
to put their hands out constituted an arrest). 
United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552 (10th Cir. 1993) is 
particularly instructive with regard to the amount of force that 
may appropriately be used to protect officer safety. In King, an 
officer approached a vehicle stopped as a result of traffic backed 
up by an accident to request that the driver stop honking the car 
horn. The officer had a brief interaction with King, the driver, 
and then noticed a handgun,with clip inserted, on the seat. The 
officer then drew her firearm, "pointed it at King, and ordered him 
to place his hands on the steering wheel, threatening to shoot him 
if he did not comply with her order." 990 F.2d at 1555. The 
10 
officer radioed for a s s i n t ;i r r ^ when a s s i s t an c e a r r i v e d K :i ng w a s 
ordered from the car, to L.., knees, and handcuffed. 
court * . n;i- i o l t i c f* r ! s observat ion <^ n 
Defendants rich, lit- , ' i s tc Jidui tu t-nsuie her own safe ty during 
the encounter " 9.9 0 F.2d at 156"] Howeveii : , the court found that 
.• Ei a c t u a ] IT ij: ] oyed wet e 1  in: ireasonab] e : 
Here, Officer LeMasters drew her gun and pointed it at 
King, threatening to shoot him if he did not comply wi" * 
her orde: . Her call for backup assistance led oth- ±. 
officers to encircle Defendants' car with weapons drawn. 
Officer Paione ordered King to his knees, and Officer 
LeMasters handcuffed him after both Defendants were 
separated from the pi.st.ol ,-m.l :•  longer presented 
threat to the safety of d;.y ot the 
bystanders. This level oi «j-. svernmental 
liberty i:= wot remotely s i in i I Defendants" 
a motorist to 
considered nde 
officers or 
intrusion on 
• to ordering 
step out of his car and can hardly be 
minimus" Tsicl or a "mi- ~- •  in^',m.;pnipnre " 
King, 990 I \2d at ] 562. 
The court concluded that "Officei LeMasters' failure to 
c a S u l iv_; ] ih i ii-4 v\ *] i l t - d t J u l i d i J I t ; . 
if -
I d . >6 3 
di sti nguished United States v__.__ Merritt , 6 ^':. K , 2d 1 26 
Tin court 
1 0 r h f 
v 1 9 8 
c e i L . ,.--.ui«.j 
where 
we held that the fact that officers approached the 
defendant with guns drawn and pointed at him did not 
render the investigative detention unreasonable. Id. at 
1273. In Merritt, the officer's actions were reasonable 
in light of the officer's suspicion that the defendant 
was an armed and dangerous murder suspect. Id. at 1274. 
In contrast, we consider similar actions by Officer 
LeMasters to be unreasonable because the justification 
for the detention was merely to ensure her safety while 
advising a lawfully armed motorist to cease honking his 
horn. 
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King, 990 F.2d at 1563 n.6. 
C. THE POLICE CONDUCT HERE EXCEEDED THE 
BOUNDS OF A PERMISSIBLE TERRY STOP. 
Officer Tuttle failed to use the least intrusive means 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Seelye sets forth 
a number of the factors to be considered: 
(1) the number of officers and police cars involved, (2) 
the nature of the crime and whether there is reason to 
believe the suspect is armed, (3) the strength of the 
officer's articulable, objective suspicions, (4) the need 
for immediate action by the officer, (5) the presence or 
lack of suspicious behavior or movement by the person 
under observation, and (6) whether there was an 
opportunity for the officer to have made the stop in less 
threatening circumstances. 
Seelye, 815 F.2d at 50. 
1. The police outnumbered appellant, 
who was alone. 
The facts here are undisputed that there were three 
uniformed officers, while appellant was alone. This factor 
suggests that drawn guns should have been unnecessary. Cf. United 
States v. Prior, 941 F.2d 427, 430 (6th Cir.) (drawing weapon 
reasonable where officer alone with two suspects), cert, denied, 
502 U.S. 993, 112 S.Ct. 613, 116 L.Ed.2d 635 (1991); United States 
v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895 (6th Cir.1990) (drawing weapon reasonable 
during "lone officer's encounter with a fleeing suspect"), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1093, 111 S. Ct. 977, 112 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1991); 
United States v. Nargi, 732 F.2d 1102 (2nd Cir. 1984) (three 
officers justified in drawing weapons where second suspect was 
missing and may have been armed and hiding in stopped van suspected 
of marijuana smuggling). 
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,
™'
 Jix . r t M ' -.' . ' . *-' • - i 11 if1 , i I i-,n 
makes ii. ^ .^ os J,J-.- .  that h^ w-^.iO U=<A ... -weapon -. n .in-, oificers 
and attempt ti. sho* ' rhr Jb • IF* lone nftjrers are occasional lv 
tikr open LU attempt; i •> i$m.y-j\ three armed officers. 
2. Mr. Petit was not suspected of any 
crime , and the officer ' s 
articulable, objective suspicions 
were weak. 
J'hii i diii i!1 hhjllil1; u n i q u e in lli.il I he o i t i c e r s iJ id not" 
s u s p e c t " P e t i t o i a n y c i i m e . P r i o r t u L :- s u d d e n m o v e m e n t , t h e 
o f f r ^ r r d ;"? r••'"*" ha-^ r-<- r e a s o n • i " r - c r . - ; 
an ^.i.'jii'i _: .J.^,, ... ........* ik<..' ijecii ^bw'ppcu v. ' i.iji' p I i v..c 1 -v/1 a . . i a* i o n 
based on reasonable;, suspicion ••*" some crime. Here there was no 
::. i :«v ,-,:.:;' ' ' : i ' ' -.ddeu nu JV< m e n I 1 . t 
T h i t •' t.* >* i J t :!-.i ; i ^ s ; ••. i : i -, • m *a ~e. ^ •.«- - t h e 
, - : • • , • . T i • . . r 
Compare United States v. Hensley, •;- I , :»' .-.C* . «-.t, 
68'v-^4, S3 ;..- i - n ^ IM^- ; police officers wer*^ "well within 
• * • - d 
P* • anuitra a n a a a n q e r o u r - " u a p p r o a c h i n g , , * i * h- - T vjuns a t -uvn , 
a v e h i c l e r h e y h a a s t o p p e d ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . L l o y d , ^6 F . ^ d ^ " l , 
y -. - d 
t h r e a t e n e d a:: . : i a i \ j a u a i ' ' e r i . d e n i e d , \b ' T • J> 131 
L . E d . ^ d >ns • . »• U n i t e d S t a t e s v . T i l men, ; - >~ ~ ,07 
C a r r o l l v . S t a t e , 636 S o . ^ d l ^ L i 1 . p i ' ^ l i p n u r d e r s u s p e c t ) ; 
Bright v. State, 455 S.E.2d 37 (Ga.) (murder suspect reaching under 
seat), cert, denied, 116 S.Ct. 196 (1995); United States v. 
Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1982) (murder suspect), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983). 
In contrast, the level of suspicion here was minimal. 
Officer Tuttle saw a sudden movement by Mr. Petit upon his being 
startled by the three officers. This movement was consistent with 
reaching for a weapon, but equally consistent with spilling a cup 
of coffee. The only additional fact contributing to Officer 
Tuttle's suspicion was the location in a high crime area. The 
facts here are dangerously close to being a mere hunch, which 
cannot support a minimal Terry stop. State v. Schlosser, 774 P. 2d 
1132, 1137 (Utah 1989) . The suspicion here is not sufficient to 
justify the highly intrusive and forceful police conduct here. 
3. While the circumstances were such 
that Officer Tuttle had to act 
quickly on the perceived safety 
threat created by appellant's sudden 
movement, the police should have 
used less intrusive means. 
Mr. Petit concedes that officers need to act quickly on 
perceived safety threats. He does not advocate a rule that 
officers should be powerless to act until a genuine threat 
develops. The question here is whether the police response was 
reasonably related in scope to the perceived threat. 
Terry contemplates a narrowly focused inquiry aimed at 
confirming or dispelling an officer's suspicions. " [T] he 
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means 
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in 
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a short period of time." Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. Terry thus 
contemplates questioning, rather than the more intrusive incidents 
of a formal arrest. If questioning elicits probable cause to 
arrest, an arrest may then take place. 
Here, the approach taken by the police was to arrest 
first and ask questions later. It is highly significant that 
Officer Tuttle never asked Mr. Petit what he was reaching for, of 
whether he was reaching for a weapon. That approach could have 
dispelled the officer's concerns in a far less obtrusive manner 
than the full shake down by three officers that occurred here. The 
lack of any questioning indicates that the officer was not nearly 
so concerned with what Mr. Petit may have dropped or been reaching 
for as arresting him, searching him, and sorting the whole 
situation out later. The mere existence of the Pioneer Park high 
crime area in Salt Lake City does not permit officers to arrest any 
member of the populace at whim. 
Merely drawing his gun out of its holster, without aiming 
it directly at Mr. Petit, would have been sufficient to protect the 
officers from any perceived danger. Cf. United States v. White, 
648 F.2d 29, 34 (D.C.Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S.Ct. 
424, 70 L.Ed.2d 233 (1981). 
The significance of the pointed gun is that it makes the 
encounter far more frightening than if the officer's gun 
remains holstered, or even drawn but pointed down at his 
side; and certainly where the danger of the encounter to 
the officer, though potentially serious, is not clear and 
present, the deliberate pointing of a gun at the suspect 
is problematic. [ ] It would be a sad day for the 
people of the United States if police had carte blanche 
to point a gun at each and every person of whom they had 
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an "articulable suspicion" of engaging in criminal 
activity. 
United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(cite omitted) . At least in the Pioneer Park area, it appears that 
the sad day described in Serna-Barreto has arrived. 
Mr. Petit was entirely compliant with police commands. 
When ordered to stop, he stopped. When ordered to place his hands 
in sight on the steering wheel, he did so. Once Mr. Petit was 
compliant, there was certainly no need for Officer Tuttle to point 
his firearm directly at Mr. Petit, yet he continued to do so. 
While the officers had a right to approach Mr. Petit in a 
consensual encounter, this encounter was no longer consensual. Mr. 
Petit was being held at gunpoint. 
The officers' actions in continuing to hold Mr. Petit at 
gunpoint, continuing to approach, and not asking any questions to 
confirm or dispel Officer Tuttle's concerns were not minimally 
intrusive, and were not the least intrusive means of confirming or 
dispelling the officer's concerns. Mr. Petit was arrested without 
probable cause. The officers did nothing to confirm or dispel his 
concern that Mr. Petit may have been reaching for a weapon to use 
to assault the officers -- instead they proceeded in a manner 
indistinguishable from a full-blown felony arrest. 
Mr. Petit was arrested without probable cause. His 
motion to suppress should have been granted. 
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REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED DECISION 
Utah has little case law addressing limits on force that 
may be used in a Terry stop, and none addressing drawn weapons. A 
published opinion would be beneficial to the bench and bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the officers' conduct was unreasonably forceful 
and less intrusive actions would have been adequate to protect 
their safety, their actions constitute an arrest without probable 
cause. Mr. Petit!s motion to suppress should have been granted. 
This Court should reverse and remand with directions that the 
motion to suppress be granted and Mr. Petit be allowed to withdraw 
his conditional plea. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £L# day of June, 1996. 
W^-— 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MARK R. MOFFAT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
The fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect -- Grounds. 
A peace office may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
